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ABSTRACT
The mutual fund industry plays an important role in the Swedish
society where a part of the future income for all people is linked
to the return of Swedish mutual fund industry and its assets.
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the competitiveness
in the Swedish premium pension system. We use publicly avail-
able data on market values, entry and exit to estimate the degree
of competition in the premium pension system. By construct-
ing a structural competition model we find that market value
of mutual funds is negatively correlated by the concentration of
the market. The premium pension system is characterized by a
high degree of entry over the study period, 2001-2013. Mutual
funds with lower market value are more likely to both enter and
exit. Our findings suggest that the probability of exit does not
increase when more mutual funds are added into the premium
pension system.
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1 Introduction
The mutual fund industry plays a vital and integrated role in today’s society and
acts as a crucial role in securing future consumption for many people. In recent
years, more and more of individual’s retirement capital has been allocated to
mutual funds through governmental actions and agreements between labor unions
and employer representatives. Since 2000 the Swedish government invest a fraction
of the public retirement capital for individuals in the mutual fund market.1 The
mutual fund industry has been highlighted in media in the last couple of years
where the focus has primary concerned mutual fund fees, active versus passive
management and profitability of the mutual fund managers.
This thesis investigates the competitiveness in the Swedish mutual fund industry
and the behavior of companies managing mutual funds in the Swedish premium
pension system between 2001 and 2013. The Swedish mutual fund industry has
experienced a dramatic growth the past years. The number of Swedish registered
mutual funds in the entire industry have more than doubled; going from 889
in 2005 to 1809 by the end of 2013 while the total market value increase from
1319 billion SEK to 2410 billion SEK during the same time period (Fondbolagens
Fo¨rening, 2014).
The premium pension system is a part of the Swedish mutual fund industry and
like the total Swedish mutual fund industry it has experienced a large increase
in both market value and number of mutual funds during the study period. The
market value of the premium pension system has increased from 65 billion SEK
in 2001 to 605 billion SEK in the end of 2013.
No other country in the world has a higher percentage of people investing in
mutual funds as in Sweden; currently 94 percent of people in Sweden are mutual
12.5 percent of all salaries up to a certain limit
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fund investors(Fondbolagens Fo¨rening, 2014). About one half of the mutual fund
industry is related to retirement capital such as the premium pension system and
other insurance-savings and the other half is related to households and corporation
direct investments (Swedish Competition Authority, 2013).
One condition for making a good mutual fund-investment decision is that the
investor has good knowledge and understanding about the product. Despite its
great importance, Swedish mutual fund investors have insufficient knowledge and
interest to make rational mutual fund investment decision and experiences low op-
portunities to negotiate term of contracts (Swedish Competition Authority, 2013).
A recent survey suggests that over 50 percent of all people use advisors for mak-
ing the mutual fund investment decisions on their behalf (TNS Sifo Prospera,
2012).
Recent studies made by the Swedish Competition Authority (2013) and AMF
Pension (2013) suggest that the fees in the mutual fund industry has in general
remained the same but has increased for some segments of the markets. The
four major banks; Handelsbanken, Nordea, SEB and Swedbank control about
60 percent of the mutual fund industry, down from 85 percent during the 1990s
(Swedish Competition Authority, 2013).
The creation of the mutual fund industry makes it possible for all people to access
the financial markets worldwide and benefit from the growth in the economy. The
mutual fund industry offers an uncountable variety of investment opportunities
with different assets, geographic focus, risk exposures and allow people to diversify
risks cost effectively. The expected return on mutual fund investments generally
depends on the return on the underlying market and the fees involved with the
investment (Swedish Competition Authority, 2013).
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A mutual fund company acts under the same circumstances as ordinary companies
whose primary goal is to maximize profits. A mutual fund investor generally
desires good risk-adjusted return at low cost which could potentially cause conflicts
of interest between the mutual fund investor and the mutual fund company (Coase,
1937).
The mutual fund industry is characterized by high barriers of entry which can po-
tentially threaten effective competition in the industry (Swedish Competition Au-
thority, 2013). New entrants must access distribution networks for marketing and
delivering the mutual funds. Some of these distribution networks are controlled
by the major banks and some independent distributor that may be competing for
the mutual fund investor. Economies of scale are significant in the mutual fund
industry. The mutual fund industry are characterized by high fixed cost when
entering the market and small variable cost making larger mutual funds more
profitable than smaller ones. Regulatory authorities monitor the Swedish mutual
fund industry and new entrants must fulfill a number of requirements for entering
the market.2
The competition in the mutual fund industry is very important to investigate since
there are many people who lack in both knowledge and interest about investing
their current financial capital. Because of the long investment period and the
large market value of the mutual fund industry, small changes in fees or delivered
quality could potentially cause severe impacts in future consumption.
We present dynamic models explaining both the determinants of the market value
of mutual funds and the determinants of entry and exit by studying measures
of competition in the premium pension system. All data has been complied and
arranged on a monthly basis from the Pensionsmyndigheten (2014).
2Finansinspektionen
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The data reveals that new mutual fund entry has occurred frequently from 575 in
2001 to 853 at the end of 2013. For 2003, 2007, 2008, 2011 the number of mutual
fund exits has exceeded the number of mutual fund entry in the premium pension
system. By excluding the publicly managed alternative the market concentration
measured by concentration ratio CR4 has decreased from 12.1 percent in 2001 to
9.3 percent at the end of 2013 while the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index has decreased
from 81 to 52 during the same time.
The results show that the probability of entry and exit are higher for mutual fund
managers with lower market values and that the probability of entry increases
when the total number of funds in the premium pension system decreases. The
probability of mutual fund exit in the premium pension system does not increase
as the number of mutual fund increases and the probability of mutual fund entry
is positively correlated with the total market value of the pension system.
The disposition of the thesis is as follows: first, in Section 2 is a brief literature
review will be given about previous research on the mutual fund industry followed
by Section 3 describing the data used and the calculations of different measures
of competition. Section 4 defines and constructs the modeling framework used to
estimate the competitiveness in the mutual fund industry. The empirical results of
the regressions made on the modeling framework will be discussed in the Section
5. The study ends by a conclusion summarizing the findings and most significant
results.
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2 Literature review
The literature on the mutual fund industry is quite extensive, where most papers
focus on the US market and some conducts cross-border research. The focus of
academic research in recent years has been on measuring performance in the mu-
tual fund industry (Sirri and Tufano, 1998). Historically the study of competition
in the mutual fund industry has not been viewed as an area of its own but rather
being a part of the competition in the banking industry (Baumol et al., 1989). No
previous research on competition in the mutual fund industry in Sweden has been
found. In general, the academic studies of competition can be separated into two
parts, structural and non-structural, where structural research explicitly modeling
the assuming causality between industry concentration and market performance
(Bikker and Haaf, 2002a).
Economist’s usually defines a competitive market as a market where there are
many producers and consumers participate trading in a standardized product or
service. Market entry is associated with zero or low costs, and consumers have
sufficient information to evaluate the characteristics of the traded good (Carlson
et al., 2004). Competitive markets are characterized by two important features:
(i) that new market players entering the market, and (ii) that this entry makes
the incumbent players change their behavior (Wahal and Wang, 2011).
Khorana and Servaes (1999) investigate factors that play an important role in the
process of new mutual fund entry in the US mutual fund market using a sample of
US mutual funds entry during the period 1979 to 1992. Four major determinants
of importance were obtained. First, there is a positive correlation between market
size and new mutual fund entry; the bigger the specific category the more likely is
it that new mutual fund entry occurs. Second, more mutual fund openings tend
to occur in categories with a larger proportion of overhang. Khorana and Servaes
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(1999) define overhang as a measure of the difference between the current value
and the acquisition price of the mutual fund or the total capital gains for the
mutual fund investor.
Third, asset managers who had performed well historically are more likely to start
new mutual funds. Fourth, and last, Khorana and Servaes (1999) conclude that
significant economies of scale exists in the US mutual fund industry based on their
discovery that large asset managers and asset managers with a history of many
new mutual fund starts will start more funds in the future.
The existence of economies of scale, described above, in the mutual fund industry
makes larger markets players more profitable than smaller market players (Baumol
et al., 1989). Gains from economies of scale might not be transferred to the mutual
fund investors through lower prices or higher quality (Freeman and Brown, 2001).
A survey made by the Swedish Competition Authority (2013) suggests that when a
mutual fund is reaching a capital over estimated 1 billion SEK, economies of scale
are significant. This implies that up to this breaking point revenues and cost are
going hand-in-hand and the capital of the mutual fund excessing 1 billion SEK is
more profitable and therefore benefiting larger asset manager in the market.
Past performance and fees are two important determinants when a mutual fund
investor chooses which mutual funds to allocate his or her money. Past perfor-
mance is of greater importance than fees (Wilcox, 2003). This is being supported
by Sirri and Tufano (1998) whom conclude that mutual funds with greater his-
torical performance experiences larger capital inflows in their mutual fund. Past
performance and fees are not independent of one another. High fees reduce the
possibility for asset managers to achieve good return to its investors. Performance
tends to be more volatile than fees over time (Trczinka and Zweig, 1990).
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Wahal and Wang (2011) examine how new entry affect the competition in the
mutual fund industry regarding management fees, cost levels, performance and
other variables. A large sample US mutual funds, money market- and bond mutual
funds excluded, over a period between 1981 and 2005 are being used. Wahal and
Wang (2011) use an approach by observing the overlap in holdings of mutual funds
as a measurement of competitiveness in the market. Overlap is simply a measure
of the degree of similarities in portfolio holdings between mutual funds.
Mutual funds with large similarities in their holding experiences both price com-
petition and quantity competition. This results in lower mutual fund fees of the
fund but this is being offset to a larger extend of an increase in distribution fees
for the price competition and for quantity competition with lower invested capital
(Wahal and Wang, 2011). Arguments are being made that if costs increase this
should affect performance of the mutual funds. Performance seems unaffected by
the measure of overlap when observing the sample for the entire period but when
observing the sample prior to 1998, a small negative correlation exists (Wahal and
Wang, 2011).
The mutual fund industry experiences price competition and a number of different
other factors influences markets shares in the industry (Khorana and Servaes,
2012). Of great importance is that front-end and back-end loads are associated
with entry and exit for an investor in the mutual funds are positively related
with market share. When loads of these kinds are being increased the market
shares also increases. Sirri and Tufano (1998) make the same conclusion that past
performance is also an important factor maintaining markets shares.
Khorana and Servaes (2012) use a data based on the market shares and fees and
investigating on a period of over 30 years, 1976 to 2009 using a sample consisting
of US mutual funds. By moving a mutual fund with a fee belonging to the fourth
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with lowest fees to the fourth with the highest fee the market share of that mutual
fund will fall by almost 20 per cent (Khorana and Servaes, 2012).
Fees and other expenses are of great importance for future performance (Carhart,
1997). A mutual fund with high fees decreases its ability to achieve superior
performance relative to other mutual funds with lower fees (Elton et al., 1993).
Literature suggests that a, historically, underperforming mutual fund will likely
be underperforming in the future, and the same is valid for over performing mu-
tual funds (Grinblatt and Titman, 1992). Sirri and Tufano (1998) and Khorana
and Servaes (2012) conclude that prior mutual fund performance is positively
correlated with larger market shares and greater capital inflows in the mutual
fund.
Investors are facing an uncountable number of choices when investing in mutual
funds. The mutual fund market offers a large variety of different mutual funds with
different characteristics offered by many asset managers (Coates and Hubbard,
2007). Search costs are related to the decision making process where an investor
must find information about mutual fund possibilities and their attributes which is
often related some kind of costs (Sirri and Tufano, 1998). Sirri and Tufano (1998)
investigates how mutual fund capital flows are behaving when taking search costs
into account, something most other model do not consider.
Search costs are interpreted as attention in the media, costs related to distribution
and marketing and last size of the managing firm. That size of managing firm
should decrease search costs cannot be concluded even though results show that
large firm grows faster than the overall market. The results show that there is
a positive correlation between media coverage and capital inflows in mutual fund
market but Sirri and Tufano (1998) argue that there could be a reverse relationship
where capital inflows cause media coverage and not the other way around.
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Mutual fund managers are interested in differentiate their mutual funds to de-
crease the importance of price competition (Hortacsu and Syverson, 2004). The
price competition among mutual funds increases when underlying mutual fund
holdings are similar (Wahal and Wang, 2011). Hortacsu and Syverson (2004) ex-
amines one of the worlds most traded and standardized mutual fund market, the
S&P 500 Index mutual fund where the asset managers have small possibilities to
differentiate their product.
Hortacsu and Syverson (2004) discovered that large differences in price between
the S&P 500 Index mutual funds exist and the average fee has increased from
the year 1995 to 2000. This depends on the fact that S&P 500 index mutual
funds entering the market charges higher fees than the incumbent mutual funds.
Hortacsu and Syverson (2004) explain these discoveries with investors costs of
finding and assessing the S&P 500 index mutual fund, the fact that asset managers
may offer other related services and that a new generation of younger investors
with insufficient knowledge about mutual funds has entered the market.
In general mutual fund investors and the mutual fund managers have different
objectives. Mutual fund investors overall goal is to maximize return on investments
taking the risk of the investment into account and mutual fund managers are
interested of maximizing profits by increasing revenues (Khorana and Servaes,
2004). This may cause conflicts of interest since the mutual fund manager can
increase its fees charged to the mutual funds decreasing the potential return for
the mutual fund investor (Elton et al., 1993).
Mutual funds charging high fees have lower market shares while mutual fund
managers that charges the mutual fund for marketing and distributing experiences
higher markets shares (Khorana and Servaes, 2004). Evidence suggests that prior
performance has become more important determinant for mutual fund investor
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since Morningstar started evaluate mutual funds in 1992. Differentiating and
innovative mutual fund managers experiences higher market share but this effect
has decreased over time, possibly because the mutual fund industry is maturing
(Khorana and Servaes, 2004).3
It is clear that competition affects the ability for mutual fund managers to set
prices without taking the fees set by its competitors into account (Coates and Hub-
bard, 2007). This conclusion is based upon the fact that the mutual fund industry
experiences low barriers to entry and that entry has occurred constantly over the
previous decades. Market concentration, measured as Herfindahl-Hirschman In-
dex,4 has fallen and market shares of incumbent firms are constantly changing
during that same period. The existence of competition in the mutual industry
implies that mutual fund fees should be determined by market structures and
not be affected by regulatory actions from governments (Coates and Hubbard,
2007).
Money market mutual funds are a segment of the mutual fund market that is
particularly affected by price competition.5 The returns for this segment of mu-
tual funds are strongly and almost explicitly depended on the fees charged by
the mutual fund managers (Coates and Hubbard, 2007). Over the last decade a
majority of the mutual fund managers have reduced their charged fees by around
half (Christoffersen, 2001).
3Morningstar is an independent rating company for mutual fund
4Herfindahl-Hirschman Index is a market concentration measurement taking all mutual fund
managers into account. See data section.
5Mutual funds with fixed income asset with less than one year to maturity
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3 Data
Pensionsmyndigheten (2014) provides data on current portfolio holding within the
premium pension system on a monthly basis. The fundamentals of this project
are built upon market values for all available mutual funds and many variables
have been derived using those market values. Every mutual fund has some char-
acteristics such as specific mutual fund manager and category. The variables used
are presented in Table 1.
Table 1: Definition of variables1
Variable Definition
Time (t) Monthly data from January 2001 to December 20131
Category Each fund i is categorized in Equity funds, fixed income
funds and mixed funds
Mutual fund manager The firm f managing the fund
Market The market j that belong to category C {Mj ∈ C}
Market value (mvi,t) The value of fund i at time t
Total market value (MVj) The total market value MVj =
∑N
i=1mvi, where N are
the funds in the specific market j
Market share (si,j) The share of mutual fund i on the specific market j si,j = mviMVj
Number of funds (nj,t) The number of funds in market j at time t , nj,t = #Mj,t
Entry (ent) The number of funds that satisfies {ent /∈Mt−1|ent ∈Mt}
Exit (ext) The number of funds that satisfies {ext ∈Mt|ext /∈Mt+1}
1Source of data: Pensionsmyndigheten (2014).
Note: Missing data from June 2006.
Every mutual fund available in the data is classified into three different categories
based on their current objective and stated investment strategy. One important
reason for choosing relatively few categories is due to the fact that categories may
change over time, and previous, or changes, in a mutual fund category have been
unable to access over time. One would expect that changes in category, over time,
to be smaller if fewer and less specific categories are chosen. The three different
categories are equity mutual funds, fixed income mutual funds and mixed mutual
funds. Mixed mutual funds are mutual funds that fail to be categorized either as
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an equity mutual fund, a fixed income mutual fund or being a combination of the
two. There are other methods of classifying mutual funds that can be used (Kim
et al., 2000).
Presented in Table 1 the definition of an entry is when a new mutual fund occurs in
the data set, and respectively, an exit occurs when a mutual fund disappears from
the data set. As a result of these definitions combined with limited information
it is not possible to determine mergers between mutual funds in the premium
pension system. If two mutual funds merge into one new mutual fund this will
be counted as two exits and one entry and if two mutual funds merge into one of
the existing mutual funds which implies that, in our data, there will only be one
exit.
The premium pension system is constructed in a way that allows individuals to
allocate their retirement capital into many different mutual funds corresponding
to their attitude to risk, expected return and other individual preferences. For
those individuals not making a choice, the state automatically provides a publicly
managed mutual fund where the equity to fixed income ratio decline when reaching
a certain age. The publicly managed mutual fund is by far the biggest mutual
fund in the system, holding a significantly larger market share than any other
mutual fund in the market over time (Pensionsmyndigheten, 2014).
As in Table 2, the market value for the publicly managed mutual fund has almost
grown tenfold from 19 to 180 billion SEK between 2001 and 2013. The market
share has been fairly constant around 30 percent of the total market since the start
implying that the growth in the total market value is approximately, the same as
the growth in the publicly managed mutual fund.
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Table 2: Market value and market share for the publicly managed mutual fund1
Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Market value 19.0 18.7 29.9 40.1 58.1 78.9 87.4 62.7 89.7 110.1 104.6 130.4 181.6
Market share 0.29 0.31 0.32 0.32 0.30 0.29 0.28 0.27 0.26 0.27 0.27 0.28 0.30
1Source of data: Pensionsmyndigheten (2014)
Note: Market value is measured in billions SEK and market share in percentage.
3.1 Industrial dynamics
Market dynamics, presented in Table 3, show market values, number of mutual
funds, number of entry and exit for all defined categories. Entry- and exit rates
have been calculated by dividing entry and exit, respectively, by the total number
of mutual funds existing in the beginning of each year.
The market value has increased significantly, almost tenfold, since the premium
pension system started in the late 2000s. Only three years have shown a decline in
market value, 2002, 2008 and 2011 which can depend on the decline in the equity
markets around these years (see Figure 1). The market value has gone from 65
billion SEK in 2001 to over 600 billion SEK 2013 and the increases are across all
categories. Fixed income has grown by a multiple of 22, equity by 7 and mixed
income by 11. The market values are depending on the return of the investments
being made and new capital allocated to the premium pension system. By the
end of 2013 equity mutual funds and mixed mutual fund was by far the biggest
categories accountable for about 95 percent the total market value and the other
5 percent is allocated to the fixed income category.
The number of mutual funds have increased over the years, from 575 in 2001 to 853
at the end of 2013. The increase holds for all categories, the percentage increase
within all categories lies between 45-65 percent from the start. For only three
years 2003, 2008 and 2011, the total change in number of mutual fund have been
negative.
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Table 3: Number of mutual funds and market dynamics1
Year
Item Category 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Market Equity 33.3 28.1 45.9 60.7 99.2 141.2 162.9 105.2 179.5 215.0 161.7 192.6 240.3
value Fixed income 1.2 1.9 2.7 3.7 4.9 7.5 12.9 24.2 21.3 23.5 28.0 24.3 27.0
Mixed 30.4 29.2 45.3 60.3 88.3 118.7 132.6 101.2 139.4 169.9 203.9 253.7 334.6
65.0 59.3 93.9 124.8 192.4 267.4 308.3 230.6 340.2 408.4 393.6 470.5 601.9
Number Equity 403 438 430 487 513 572 576 580 575 568 544 554 587
of funds Fixed income 85 103 107 116 117 122 122 108 111 119 117 126 139
Mixed 87 94 79 78 81 83 81 79 88 95 109 125 127
575 635 616 681 711 777 779 767 774 782 770 805 853
Entry Equity 100 62 58 85 49 76 45 63 35 39 59 46 63
Fixed income 25 22 18 10 9 13 11 6 6 12 9 16 20
Mixed 3 11 2 7 4 9 1 2 14 11 23 27 10
128 95 78 102 62 98 57 71 55 62 91 89 93
Exit Equity 8 28 66 27 23 16 46 56 38 46 84 37 29
Fixed income 5 4 14 1 8 7 12 21 2 4 11 7 7
Mixed 1 4 17 8 1 7 3 7 2 4 9 14 5
14 36 97 36 32 30 61 84 42 54 104 58 41
Entry Equity — 0.15 0.13 0.20 0.10 0.15 0.08 0.11 0.06 0.07 0.10 0.08 0.11
rates Fixed income — 0.26 0.17 0.09 0.08 0.11 0.09 0.05 0.06 0.11 0.08 0.14 0.16
Mixed — 0.13 0.02 0.09 0.05 0.11 0.01 0.02 0.18 0.12 0.24 0.25 0.08
Exit Equity — 0.07 0.15 0.06 0.05 0.03 0.08 0.10 0.07 0.08 0.15 0.07 0.05
rates Fixed income — 0.05 0.14 0.01 0.07 0.06 0.10 0.17 0.02 0.04 0.09 0.06 0.06
Mixed — 0.05 0.18 0.10 0.01 0.09 0.04 0.09 0.03 0.05 0.09 0.13 0.04
1Source of data: Pensionsmyndigheten (2014)
The table presents an overview of market dynamics by the end of each year.
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The rate of entry and exit fluctuates heavily between 2001 and 2013. Some remarks
can be of importance. Between 2007 and 2013 the rate of entry felt and exit rates
rose for equity mutual funds, making the number of equity mutual funds fairly
constant over the period. During 2011 and 2012 the number of mixed mutual funds
increased by almost 25 percent annually, the highest entry rate in the data.
3.2 Market concentration ratio
The Concentration Ratio (CR) is calculated with using the formula shown in
equation (1), where k is the number of market share observations, si is the market
share of the mutual fund sorted in descending order (Cabral, 2000).
CRk = 100
k∑
i=1
si (1)
The Concentration Ratio (CR)4 only measures the concentration amongst the
four largest mutual funds in the premium pension system, it can therefore only
be used as partial information about the mutual fund industry. The index ranges
from 0 to 100 percent, where 100 percent corresponds to the entire mutual fund
market covered by the top four mutual funds which is likely to be an oligopoly or
possibly even a monopoly. A ratio towards 0 percent corresponds to many small
market players having no significant influences in the industry. An oligopoly is
often defined as a market in which the top four businesses have a concentration
ratio above 40 percent (Mahajan, 2006).
Table 4 shows that all concentrations ratios (CR4) in our data are lower today
compared to the start (2001). Four mutual fund managers control 60 percent of
the market which indicated an oligopoly-characterized market (Mahajan, 2006).
About 10 percent of the market is being controlled by the top four mutual funds.
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An adjusted index has been used to describe concentration ratios without taken
the biggest, publicly managed mutual fund, into account. The category for equity
mutual funds has, over the entire period, been the less concentrated category
and has experienced the smallest decrease in concentration ratio from the start.
Both fixed income and mixed mutual funds has decreased its concentration by
approximately ten percent.
Table 4: Market concentration by concentration index (CR4)1
Year
CR4 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Mutual fund 38.75 39.99 40.50 41.28 39.19 38.54 36.62 34.77 34.06 35.03 33.72 34.74 37.31
Mutual fund2 12.10 11.00 11.45 11.94 11.72 11.67 10.48 9.37 9.62 9.85 9.33 9.28 9.30
Asset manager 66.78 68.34 69.94 70.20 67.65 67.10 65.14 65.51 61.37 59.94 60.93 59.86 60.83
Equity 23.59 23.22 23.45 24.53 22.71 22.11 19.84 20.53 18.22 18.71 19.93 19.89 20.61
Fixed income 43.39 40.11 38.53 41.55 40.75 44.76 46.31 38.37 45.93 50.01 37.03 33.34 34.44
Mixed 73.50 74.91 78.64 78.75 77.61 77.64 76.86 72.65 74.06 73.51 63.00 61.88 64.34
Mixed2 35.89 38.80 46.27 44.66 41.29 40.14 38.80 35.29 33.34 30.73 28.63 26.26 26.47
1Source of data: Pensionsmyndigheten (2014)
2An adjusted index measuring the mutual funds k ∈ [2, 5], or CR14 = CR5 − CR1.
3.3 Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
Since the concentration ratio only takes the k largest mutual funds into account
it is necessary to introduce the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) to capture the
distribution of market shares for all mutual funds in the premium pension system.
The HHI is calculated with the following formula, where n is the number mutual
funds in the market, and si is the market share of each mutual fund (Cabral,
2000). The formula is given by equation (2).
HHI = 10, 000
n∑
i=1
s2i (2)
The HHI ranges from zero to ten-thousand, where a small number of the index
indicates a fragmented market with many market players with small market shares.
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On the contrary, a high number of the HHI indicates a market with relatively few
market players with large market shares. Since the HHI is a square of market
shares, larger market players are given higher weight than small market players in
the index (Cabral, 2000).
The HHI plays an important role in the decision making process whether to allow
horizontal mergers in the United States (Bikker and Haaf, 2002a). The United
States Justice Department classify market with a HHI up to 1,500 as unconcen-
trated markets and markets above as either moderately or highly concentrated
(United States Justice Department, 2010).
The HHI for our data is presented below in Table 5. Most of the defined markets
can be categorized as unconcentrated with a low number of the HHI with excep-
tion for mutual fund manager and mixed mutual funds. The reason for a high
HHI for mixed mutual funds is due to the fact that the publicly managed mutual
fund lies within this category. When excluding the publicly managed mutual fund
the HHI falls significantly. This is consistent with the Swedish Competition Au-
thority (2013) investigation of the Swedish mutual fund market that the industry
experiences competition due to the fact that HHI has decreased over time.
Table 5: Market concentration by Herfindahl-Hirschman Index1
Year
Item 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Mutual fund 939 1,062 1,086 1,107 982 938 864 794 752 782 762 821 963
Mutual fund2 81 72 76 73 70 68 61 57 57 56 55 54 52
Mutual fund manager 1,554 1,646 1,675 1,693 1,568 1,536 1,455 1,429 1,306 1,253 1,336 1,329 1,443
Equity 252 244 238 233.6 207 196 171 179 161 162 164 171 181
Fixed income 706 611 577 608.3 579 704 777 520 687 782 509 457 447
Mixed 3,974 4,127 4,414 4,495 4,402 4,479 4,410 3,901 4,199 4,242 2,743 2,711 3,020
Mixed2 66 66 81 74 69 65 64 71 58 51 91 84 74
1Source of data: Pensionsmyndigheten (2014)
2An adjusted index excluding the mutual fund with the biggest market share, i.e. H1 = ∑Nn=2 s2n · 10, 000.
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3.4 Evaluation of concentration and OMX30 index
As previously mentioned, Figure 1 shows changes in measures of the market con-
centration and the number of mutual funds compared to an equity index rep-
resenting the return of the 30 biggest companies in the Swedish equity market
(OMX30).
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Figure 1: Equity index compared with various measures over time
∗Source of data: Pensionsmyndigheten (2014) and Yahoo finance (2014)
Two large declines in the Swedish equity market have occurred during the lifetime
of the premium pension system. Firstly the burst of the technology bubble in
the early 2000s and secondly the financial crisis in 2008. The total number of
mutual funds increased fast during the first years of the premium pension system
(2001-2007). After the financial crisis in 2008 the total number of mutual funds
was fairly constant but seems to increase at the end of the study period. The total
number of mutual funds appears not to be influenced by the development of the
Swedish equity market.
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Both the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index and the concentration rate (CR4) appears
in a wave-like movement over time with small changes relative to each other. Con-
centration ratio by the fourth biggest firm correlates strongly with the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (Bailey and Boyle, 1971).
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4 Theoretical Framework
In order to answer the question, ”Is the market competitive?”, we should ask
ourselves ”How does the market affect the mutual funds?”. In this section we
study how external variables can be used to describe the change in market values
of individual mutual funds. This section also investigates what market dynamics
are beneficial for new mutual funds to enter as to what environment that is more
likely to drive mutual funds out of business.
To answer these questions, different regression analyses are used for which different
models are constructed. This way, we can determine how different variables af-
fect the mutual fund’s performance in different market environments. Regression
models using Ordinary Least Square (OLS) will be used, together with logistic
regression.
4.1 Adjustments for time variable and market return
Changes in asset prices in the financial markets affect the total value of the mutual
fund market and the individual mutual fund. Since the focus of this paper is to
investigate the competition it is reasonable to isolate variables explaining compe-
tition and adjust for changes in the markets value caused by the changes in asset
prices. Thus, some limited economic causality may exist since high fees will have
a negative effect on market values of the mutual funds and the total market value
(Carhart, 1997).
The that market values in the premium pension system may change mainly due
to three things; (i) the performance of the financial markets (i.e. asset prices), (ii)
new capital being allocated to the premium pension system in December and (iii)
how individuals choose to allocate their capital in terms of expected return.
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Since we are interested in how the market affects the mutual funds, the regressions
are compensated for time by the variable ΥT ′ as seen in equation (3). The variable
T consists of M and Y , where M are all the month (Jan-Dec) and Y are all the
years in the period 2001-2013 treated as dummy variables. The variable Υ consists
of the market return coefficients. This removes any time aspect that may be the
same for all the mutual funds in the market, which gives us a better estimate for
how the market affects the different mutual funds.
ΥT ′ =
[
Υm Υy
]  M
Y
 = ΥmM+ ΥyY (3)
4.2 Competition and market value
We want to model how the market value changes for different mutual funds by
studying the market dynamics. For this, we need to construct a model that ex-
plains the market value of each mutual fund given certain characteristics of the
mutual fund and the entire market. By carefully selecting the variables known to
relate to the competition, we may analyze the result in a similar manner.
Traditionally, the marginal revenue or the size of the firm is analyzed with respect
to the market dynamics as in Bikker and Haaf (2002b). In this case, the true
revenue from each mutual fund is not easily available. Instead the size of the
mutual fund is used, since the revenue is proportional to the market value of the
mutual fund . The formula that describes the market’s impact on the mutual fund
market values is shown in equation (4)
21
loge(mvi,t) = β0 loge(MVt−1) + β1 loge(nt−1) + β2 loge(CR4t−1)
+ β3C loge(CR4ct−1) + β4C + ΥT ′ + i,t. (4)
The market value (mvi,t) of each mutual fund i at time t is explained by the
following variables at time t − 1. The total market value (MVt−1), the number
of mutual funds in the market (nt−1) and the concentration ratio CR4t−1 are
all characteristics of the market and are the same for every mutual fund. The
concentrations ratio (CR4t−1) is interpreted as the competition variable. Basic
intuition tells us that, if the mutual fund market is competitive, an increase in
total number of mutual funds should imply that there will be less value for each
mutual fund indicating a negative value of β1. Other parameters in the regressions
such as the total market value that is expected to yield a positive value for β0 as
there will be more value in the mutual fund market. Some variables are expressed
as natural logarithm since the percentage value is more interesting than absolute
values. The coefficient for these variables should be interpreted as elasticity.
The category of mutual funds (C = [Cequity Cmixed Cfixed]T ) is taken into con-
sideration as a categorical dummy variable, resulting in three different estimates
for β3 and three different estimates for β4. The index CR4ct−1 is the concentra-
tion ratio for the specific category, meaning that β2 gives the estimate of the effect
of the total CR4 whereas the estimate β3 estimates the effect of the concentration
ratio in the specific category. Special care needs to be taken when analyzing these
variables because of the market relation; the CR4 indicates that the top four mu-
tual funds have increased their market value relative the other mutual funds which
means it could be positive for some mutual funds and negative to others.
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Variation in the model explained by other variables are expressed by a market
share shock factor i,t for every mutual fund i at time t. i,t is assumed to have
no correlation with past or present data. As explained in subsection 4.1, ΥT ′
explains changes in market returns.
4.3 Probability of entry and exit
The probability for an entry or an exit to occur cannot be estimated with the OLS
method because entry and exit is a binning variable. We want a binary response
model, for which we can calculate the probability of entry and exit under certain
market conditions. For this, we will use logistic regression.
Assuming that we have a probability of an event to occur p ∈ [0, 1], and to
not happen q = 1 − p. The logistic function is derived by taking the natural
logarithm of the odds function in equation (5), Wooldridge (2012), to achieve the
link function seen in equation (6).
log( p1− p) = α + β0x0 + ...+  (5)
Pr(x = 1|X) = Φ(α + β0x0 + ...|X) = e
(α+β0x0+...)
1 + e(α+β0x0+...) = p (6)
The marginal effect in equation (7), can be found by differentiating the link func-
tion with respect to the variable of interest. Similarly, if we have the natural
logarithm of the variable the marginal effect is expressed as in equation (8).
d
dxi
Φ(x′β + ) = e
(x′β+)
(1 + e(x′β+))2βi =
dp
dxi
(7)
d
dxi
Φ(...βi log xi + ...) =
e(x
′β+)
(1 + e(x′β+))2
βi
xi
= dp
dxi
(8)
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4.4 Determinants of entry and exit
The reason for a mutual fund to exit the market may be dependent on different as-
pects both endogenous and exogenous. In this model an assumption is being made
that the market environment is more competitive as the market concentration in-
creases, resulting in a higher probability for an exit. Likewise, the probability for
an exit can be assumed to increase as more mutual funds are present having all
other market characteristics the same since mutual funds compete for a limited
amount of capital.
The probability of an exit to occur can be described by the total value of the market
at time t − 1, MVt−1, and the value of the mutual fund manager MVmi,t−1 for
mutual fund i at time t − 1. ΥT ′ consists of categorical variables for the year
and month as explained in subsection 4.1. Like before, i,t are shocks for mutual
fund i at time t, that explains variation not related to the model and that are not
correlated with present or past data. The model is seen in equation (9).
Pr(Exit = 1|X) = Φ(α + β1MVt−1 + β2MVmi,t−1 + ΥT′ + i,t) (9)
It is believed that the coefficients β1 is negative, as the chance of an exit to occur
would decrease with more money in the market. The coefficient for the market
value of the mutual fund manager is more difficult to interpret. Larger mutual
fund managers are more likely to handle external market events better.
Another model, taking the natural logarithm of the previous variables is seen equa-
tion (10). Modeling the natural logarithm of variables gives a different marginal
effect to the model, and gives a broader picture on how the market affects the exit
of the mutual funds. As before, MVt−1 is the total value of the market at time
t − 1, MVmi,t−1 is the value of the mutual fund managers for mutual fund i at
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time t−1 and nt−1 is the number of mutual funds in the market at time t−1.
Pr(Exit = 1|X) = Φ(α + β1 logeMVt−1 + β2 loge nt−1+
β3 logeMVmi,t−1 + ΥT′ + i,t) (10)
ΥT ′ consists of categorical variables for the year and month to adjust for season-
ality and trends in the data. i,t−1 are shocks for mutual fund i at time t− 1 that
are not correlated with present or past data, and explain variation in the data not
related to the model.
Just as before, we expect the coefficient for the total market value to be negative
as with more money in the market we would have a lower probability of exit.
The coefficient of the market value of the mutual fund manager can give us very
much information on how the mutual fund managers behaves in the market. The
coefficient β2, indicating the behavior of the number of mutual funds in the market
on exit among the mutual funds is thought to be negative, since generally more
competitors increases the competitions.
Considering the entry in the market, we have to look at the market environment
of the mutual funds entering. We can model the market concentration by the
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) and the number of mutual funds, as seen in
equation (11). Here HHIt−1 is the HHI at time t − 1, and nt−1 are the number
of mutual funds in the market at time t− 1. Further, we have that MVt−1 is the
market value of the total market at time t− 1, and MVmi,t−1 is the market value
of the mutual fund managers at time t− 1.
Pr(Entry = 1|X) = Φ(α + β1HHIt−1 + β2MVt−1+
β3nt−1 + β4MVmi,t−1 + ΥT ′ + i,t) (11)
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Once again, ΥT ′ consist of categorical variables for the year and month as ex-
plained in 4.1 and i,t are uncorrelated shocks.
As HHI is a market concentration measure, β1 is believed to be negative if com-
petition affects entry. This is because with a higher value of HHI, we expect to
have a lower probability of entry, or likewise, with a lower value HHI we expect
to have a higher probability of entry. β2 is believed to be positive, since when the
market grows so would the number of mutual funds.
In this regression, we take the natural logarithm of HHIt−1 and MVt−1. nt−1 is
the number of mutual funds in the market at time t − 1 and MVmi,t−1 is the
market value of the mutual fund manager of the mutual fund i at time t− 1. The
models is seen in equation (12).
Pr(Entry = 1|X) = Φ(α + β1 logeHHIt−1 + β2 logeMVt−1+
β3nt−1 + β4MVmi,t−1 + ΥT ′ + i,t) (12)
Adjustments for seasonality and trends are made with the coefficients ΥT ′ and
the uncorrelated shocks are modeled with i,t. Even if the natural logarithm is
applied to HHI and the total market value, these coefficients β1 and β2, are still
believed to be positive.
4.5 Construction of modeling framework
In the process of constructing the modeling framework, some important aspects
have been considered. To avoid misleading relationships in the regression models
special care has been taken to create models based upon economic arguments.
Mainly three different statistical measures of regression models are used; (i) ad-
26
justed R-square, (ii) statistical significance and (iii) Akaike Information Criterion
(AIC).
The adjusted R-square is a statistical measure between 0 and 1 that gives infor-
mation about how much of the total variation in the regression that can explained
by the model, i.e. how well the regression approximates the data. It represents
the percentage of the variance of the data that can be explained by knowing the
dependent values.
The relevance of individual parameters and estimates in the regression models is
determined by student’s t-test and is obtained by dividing the β coefficient by
the standard error of the regression model. Statistical significance indicates that
the effect of a dependent variable is not only due to just chance alone and is an
important key in sensitivity analysis (Wooldridge, 2012).
A relative measure for determine the goodness of fit for a specific regression model
and its parameters can be calculated by using AIC (Steckel-Berger et al., 1985).
The model is, AIC = 2k − 2 loge(L), where k is the number of parameters in the
regression model and L is the maximized likelihood function for the model.
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5 Results
This section presents the results from performing regressions based on the con-
structed equations described in the previous section.
5.1 Competition and market value
The performance of the market value for mutual fund i is investigated from inter-
preting external market factors according to equation (4) and the results is seen
in Table 6.
The total market value for the premium pension system at t− 1 affects the indi-
vidual market value for mutual fund i. In the model we notice that a percentage
change in the total market value will result in a 0.8 percent change in the market
value for mutual fund i. This result might seem surprisingly since the sum of all
market values of mutual fund i should be equal to approximately the total market
value at time t− 1.
This result can be explained mainly by two things; (i) new capital is allocated
on a year basis to the premium pension system, but is not evenly distributed
among the mutual funds and (ii) the market value for mutual fund i and the
total market value depend to a great extent on the returns on various assets in
the global financial markets. Since mutual fund carries different characteristics in
terms of expected return and volatility they may perform differently, resulting in
a shift between the growth in the total market value the growth of the mutual
fund i.
Results show that if more mutual funds are added to the premium pension system
the market value for mutual fund i decreases since there will be less market value
for each mutual fund to compete for. Expanding the number of mutual funds by
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Table 6: Results of the market value regression
Explanatory variable Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
Loge of total market valuet−1 0.8000 0.1048 7.64 0.0000
Loge of number of mutual fundst−1 -4.1769 0.3352 -12.46 0.0000
Loge of CR4,t−1 -1.3871 0.5944 -2.33 0.0196
Cequity 21.4131 3.0405 7.04 0.0000
Cmixed 27.7316 3.1815 8.72 0.0000
Cfixed 29.7959 3.0140 9.89 0.0000
Cequity loge CR4,t−1,equity 1.8408 0.1857 9.91 0.0000
Cmixed loge CR4,t−1,mixed 0.1210 0.2873 0.42 0.6737
Cfixed loge CR4,t−1,fixed -0.8637 0.1884 -4.58 0.0000
Adj. R2 0.9781
No. of observations 110,225
Trend and seasonal adjustment1 Yes
Results from the regression in eq. (4), without the coefficients for the market return ad-
justments. Note that all natural logarithms variables should be interpreted as elasticity. To
remind the reader, the model is shown below
loge(mvi,t) = β0 loge(MVt−1) + β1 loge(nt−1) + β2 loge(CR4t−1) + β3C loge(CR4ct−1) +
β4C + ΥT ′ + i,t
1The data is adjusted for external market conditions that may affect the market value of
the mutual fund
one percent will result in a decrease of 4.18 percent in market value for mutual
fund i, indicating a clear effect of entry and exit.
The variable CR4 in equation (4) is, as described in the previous section, inter-
preted as a measure of market concentration is assumed to represent the degree
of competition in the premium pension system. An increase in the value of the
market concentration (CR4) implies that the four biggest mutual funds increase
their market shares and vice versa. The results of the regression on equation
(4) reveals that the market value of the mutual fund i is affected by the market
concentration. The relationship between market value and market concentration
is negative implying that as the market becomes more concentrated the mutual
funds will have less market value compared with a less concentrated market. An
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increases of the market concentration by 1 percent decreases the market value for
mutual fund i by almost 1.4 percent.
The estimates for the category Ci can only be interpreted as relative measure of
average market value within each category. Mutual funds belonging to the equity
category have the lowest average market value while mixed mutual funds has the
highest average market value and fixed mutual funds have an average market value
between equity- and mixed mutual funds.
Even though the estimates for the competition variable show a reverse relationship
between market value for mutual fund i and market concentration (CR4) the
relationship within each of the created categories are affected unevenly. As the
market becomes more concentrated, the market value of equity- and mixed mutual
funds also increases. For equity mutual funds the change of 1 percent in the
competition variable implies an increase in market value of slightly 1.8 percent.
Mixed mutual funds show little response to changes in market concentration and
an increase of 1 percent in the competition variable affects the market value by
0.12 percent but this result in not statistically significant. Fixed mutual funds
are negatively affected and experience a negative relationship between market
concentration and market value. If the market concentration increases by 1 percent
the market value falls by 0.86 percent for fixed mutual funds.
The result of this model is based upon 110,225 observations and adjustments
have been made for dummy variable time and month. Almost 98 percent of
the total variation in the model can be described by the chosen variables. A
large proportion of this variation is related to the adjustments for market return;
variable ΥT′.
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5.2 Determinants of exit
Modeling the historical exit of mutual funds in the market, by previous market
conditions, yields the results seen in Table 7. We find that, with a negative
intercept we have a very low probability of an exit. We also find that with more
money in the market, we have a lower probability of exit. This makes economic
sense, as there would be a larger potential of making profits when there is more
money in the mutual fund market. However, the coefficient is not significant to
the 5 percent level.
The coefficient for the variable of the market value of the mutual fund manager
is negative. This tells us that mutual funds managed by corporation with large
market value will have a smaller probability of an exit. We still do not know the
market value of the mutual fund, but we know that as the mutual funds grow in
market value so will the mutual fund managers. The coefficient is significant to
the 1 percent level, indicating a very small chance of exit not being affected by
the market value of the mutual fund manager.
Table 7: Exit regression
Explanatory variable Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)
(Intercept) -6.3752 0.3463 -18.41 0.0000
Total market valuet−1 -3.257e-12 0.0000 -1.42 0.1563
Market value of manageri,t−1 -2.109e-11 0.0000 -5.26 0.0000
AIC 8 059.3
No. of observations 110 225
Trend and seasonal adjustment1 Yes
Results from the regression in eq. (9), without the coefficients for the market return ad-
justments. To remind the reader, the model is shown below
Pr(Exit = 1|X) = Φ(α+ β1MVt−1 + β2MVmi,t−1 + ΥT′ + i,t)
1The data is adjusted for external market conditions that may affect exit
The model is compensated for trend and seasonality, and the full regression results
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can be seen in Appendix B. Investigating these results for a mutual fund manager
with a market value of 50 MSEK tells us that the probability of an exit would
be about 0.12 percent. The marginal effect, as described in Section 4.3, is larger
for the variable describing the market value of the mutual fund. However, we
know that the market value of the total market will fluctuate more in absolute
number than would the market value of a mutual fund manager. For a mutual
fund manager with a market value of 50 MSEK, we find that the marginal effect
is nearly insignificant.6
Modeling the natural logarithm of the variables allows us to look into the per-
centage change of the variable with respect to the probability of an exit. In the
model, we have the natural logarithm of the market value of the mutual fund i at
time t− 1, the natural logarithm of the number of mutual funds at time t− 1. We
also describe the probability of an exit to occur by the natural logarithm of the
market value of the mutual fund manager of mutual fund i at time t − 1. This
expression models the probability of an exit better than the previous model, as
seen by the lowered AIC that was 8,059 for the previous regression and is now
7,881. The results are seen in Table 8.
The negative mutual fund specific coefficient tells us that as the two market values
increase the probability of exit decreases. This is in line with the previous result,
and is what we expected to happen. Mutual funds that have a larger market
value would most likely be more profitable and thus would have a smaller prob-
ability of exit. The same logic goes for mutual funds with larger mutual fund
managers, especially as they could very well be less sensitive to external market
conditions.
It is surprising that with more mutual funds in the market, we have a lower prob-
6The marginal effect of the probability of an exit to occur is -3.8237e-05 percent / MSEK
as for changes in the total market value, and -2.4760e-04 percent / MSEK for changes in the
market value of the mutual fund manager.
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ability of exit. This coefficient is just significant to the 5 percent level, but does
still indicate a sign that goes against what we previously expected. It is, however,
likely that more mutual funds enter the market when the market conditions are
beneficial for mutual funds, which at the same time, would be a time when few
mutual funds would want to exit the market. This scenario would explain why
there would be a lower probability of an exit when the mutual fund market is
expanding in mutual funds.
Table 8: Extended exit regression
Explanatory variable Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)
(Intercept) 21.9622 12.5499 1.75 0.0801
Loge Market valuei,t−1 -0.1492 0.0180 -8.31 0.0000
Loge Number of mutual fundst−1 -3.9195 2.0103 -1.95 0.0512
Loge Market value of manageri,t−1 -0.0972 0.0199 -4.88 0.0000
AIC 7,880.7
No. of observations 110,225
Trend and seasonal adjustment1 Yes
Results from the regression in eq. (10), without the coefficients for the market return
adjustments. To remind the reader, the model is shown below
Pr(Exit = 1|X) = Φ(α+ β1 logeMVt−1 + β2 loge nt−1 + β3 logeMVmi,t−1 + ΥT′ + i,t)
1The data is adjusted for external market conditions that may affect exit
Predicting an exit of a mutual fund at the market conditions in December 2013,
with a market value of 40 MSEK and a mutual fund manager with market value
of 50 MSEK tells us that there would be a 0.15 percent probability of an exit.
Looking into the marginal effect of the variables as described in Section 4.3, we
find that a percentual increase change in the market value of the mutual fund
yields a change in the probability of an exit with -0.02 percent. An increase in the
number of mutual funds at time t− 1, with 1 percent results in a decrease of the
exit probability by 0.58 percent.
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The marginal effect on the increasing number of mutual funds does not make sense
out of a competitive view point. It would, however, be possible to imagine that if
the market is doing well at a certain time t−1 more mutual funds would enter the
mutual fund market and few mutual funds would want to exit. Likewise, when
the market is doing poorly we would have more exit.
The similar results in the two regressions implies that the result is robust.
5.3 Determinants of entry
The probability of a mutual fund to entry the market is modeled by several differ-
ent market characteristics at time t − 1. Additionally, entry is modeled by a the
mutual fund manager that can have other mutual funds in the market and thus
already some market value at time t−1. The results are presented in Table 9.
The probability of entry is negatively correlated with the total number of mutual
funds in the premium pension system and is positively correlated with the market
concentration measure Herfindahl-Hirschman Index. As the premium pension sys-
tem becomes more concentrated the probability of entry increases and is against
our initial beliefs that the probability of entry should increase when market con-
centration HHI decreases. This coefficient is statistical significant to the 1 percent
level.
With a higher total market value of the premium pension system we find a higher
probability of entry. The previous exit regressions showed a higher probability
of exit as the total market value decreased, which is consisted with this result.
Additional market value of the premium pension system gives opportunities for
more mutual funds, which could explain the increased probability of entry. The
coefficient is not statistical significant to the 1 percent level.
34
We also find that the probability of entry are higher for mutual fund managers with
smaller total market value. This result is similar to the exit regressions, indicating
that smaller mutual fund managers are more frequent in entering and exiting in
the premium pension system. Not knowing the market value of the mutual funds,
it is believed that larger mutual fund managers are more profitable, because of
economies of scale in the industry, and thus experiences a lower frequency of entry
and exit.
Table 9: Entry regression
Explanatory variable Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)
(Intercept) 5.1102 1.2969 3.94 0.0001
Herfindahl-Hirschman Indext−1 0.0037 0.0013 2.83 0.0046
Total market valuet−1 3.02e-12 0.0000 1.50 0.1336
Market value of manageri,t−1 -3.24e-11 0.0000 -7.35 0.0000
Number of mutual fundst−1 -0.0248 0.0021 -11.55 0.0000
AIC 11,667
No. of observations 110,225
Trend and seasonal adjustment1 Yes
Results from the regression in eq. (11), without the coefficients for the market return
adjustments. To remind the reader, the model is shown below
Pr(Entry = 1|X) = Φ(α+ β1HHIt−1 + β2MVt−1 + β3nt−1 + β4MVmt−1 + ΥT ′ + i,t)
1The data is adjusted for external market conditions that may affect entry
Investigating the result at the market levels of December 2013 shows that there
is a probability of 1.242 percent for an entry for a mutual fund with no previous
market value of the mutual fund manager.
It is important to keep in mind that investors in the mutual fund market are
generally slow moving. The horizon of these investments are, for many people
several decades. Together with the entry barriers in the mutual fund market,
there are many variables these regressions don’t show.
Modeling the entry in the market by the same variables, but applying the natural
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logarithm of the HHI and the total market value indicates a similar result. The
coefficients for the number of mutual funds at time t − 1 and the coefficient for
the market value of the mutual fund manager are similar to the previous entry re-
gression. As before, the coefficients are significant to the 1 percent level indicating
that the entry are affected by the variables. The result is seen in Table 10.
The difference lies in the coefficient of the intercept and the variables where the
natural logarithm has been applied. Making the same prediction as before, for the
market conditions of December 2013 and a market value of the managing firm of
0 SEK gives a consistent results with the previous prediction. We find that the
probability of an entry is 1.240 percent.
Table 10: Extended entry regression
Explanatory variable Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)
(Intercept) -53.9378 12.6455 -4.27 0.0000
Loge Herfindahl-Hirschman Indext−1 4.3187 1.1867 3.64 0.0003
Loge Total market valuet−1 1.3701 0.3870 3.54 0.0004
Market value of manageri,t−1 -3.26e-11 0.0000 -7.38 0.0000
Number of mutual fundst−1 -0.0263 0.0022 -11.99 0.0000
AIC 11,654
No. of observations 110,225
Trend and seasonal adjustment1 Yes
Results from the regression in eq. (12), without the coefficients for the market return
adjustments. To remind the reader, the model is shown below
Pr(Entry = 1|X) = Φ(α+β1 logeHHIt−1+β2 logeMVt−1+β3nt−1+β4MVmt−1+ΥT ′ +
i,t)
1The data is adjusted for external market conditions that may affect entry
Investigating the marginal effect of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) and
the total market value shows the importance of the HHI. For a possible mutual
fund entry with a mutual fund manager with market value of 0 SEK, the marginal
effect of a percentage increase in HHI indicates a change in the probability of an
entry by 0.0537 percent. A percent increase in the total market value results in an
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increase of 0.016 percent in the probability of an entry. An increase of one mutual
fund results in a decrease if 0.03 percent in the probability of entry.
Applying the natural logarithm to the HHI and the total market value fits the entry
slightly better as seen by the lowered AIC. Overall, the regressions shows statistical
significant results that are consistent with our economic theory. The different
regressions shows similar results, indicating that the results are robust.
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6 Conclusion
This report investigates the level of competition among the mutual funds in the
premium pension system by modeling the change in market value, entry and exit.
Historical data on the mutual funds from 2001 to 2013 have been used to sup-
port the regression analysis, where the market concentration indexes Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI) and Concentration Ratio (CR) are introduced.
The findings indicates that there is competition in the Swedish premium pension
system. Changes in CR4 affects the market value of the mutual funds negatively,
as the market becomes more concentrated the market value of the mutual funds
decreases. The market value of mutual funds are negatively correlated with the
number of mutual funds in the premium pension system. We find a higher proba-
bility of smaller mutual fund managers to enter and exit the mutual fund market.
The probability of mutual funds’ entry in the market is negatively correlated with
the total number of mutual funds and the probability of entry increases when the
total market value of the premium pension system increases. Mutual funds are
more likely to exit the market as the total market value of the premium pension
system decreases. The current level of the market concentration indexes CR4 is at
37 and HHI is at 963. Together, these findings support the idea of a competitive
premium pension system.
Further research may expand the regressions to involve more mutual fund specific
parameters or by taking different perspectives of competition. Since this thesis
has focused on relating industrial dynamics to competition of the overall market,
further research may also relate competition to the conduct and performance of
mutual fund managers on a company level.
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Appendices
A Results market value regression
Table 11: Results of the market value regression
Explanatory variable Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
Loge Total market valuet−1 0.8000 0.1048 7.64 0.0000
Loge Number of mutual fundst−1 -4.1769 0.3352 -12.46 0.0000
Loge CR4,t−1 -1.3871 0.5944 -2.33 0.0196
Cequity 21.4131 3.0405 7.04 0.0000
Cmixed 27.7316 3.1815 8.72 0.0000
Cfixed 29.7959 3.0140 9.89 0.0000
Cequity loge CR4,t−1,equity 1.8408 0.1857 9.91 0.0000
Cmixed loge CR4,t−1,mixed 0.1210 0.2873 0.42 0.6737
Cfixed loge CR4,t−1,fixed -0.8637 0.1884 -4.58 0.0000
February 0.0117 0.0384 0.31 0.7597
Mars 0.0207 0.0389 0.53 0.5957
April 0.0559 0.0392 1.42 0.1543
May 0.0525 0.0401 1.31 0.1900
June 0.0362 0.0415 0.87 0.3835
July 0.0758 0.0416 1.82 0.0687
August 0.0621 0.0407 1.53 0.1268
September 0.0532 0.0412 1.29 0.1964
October 0.0894 0.0411 2.18 0.0296
November 0.0849 0.0413 2.06 0.0398
December 0.1215 0.0417 2.91 0.0036
2002 0.2847 0.0662 4.30 0.0000
2003 0.5278 0.0773 6.83 0.0000
2004 0.7007 0.0985 7.11 0.0000
2005 1.0402 0.1287 8.08 0.0000
2006 1.2947 0.1700 7.61 0.0000
2007 1.5026 0.2035 7.38 0.0000
2008 1.6400 0.2079 7.89 0.0000
2009 1.7997 0.2267 7.94 0.0000
2010 1.9947 0.2510 7.95 0.0000
2011 2.0828 0.2579 8.08 0.0000
2012 2.0370 0.2651 7.68 0.0000
2013 2.0923 0.2723 7.68 0.0000
Adj. R2 0.9781
No. of observations 110 225
42
B Result exit regression
Table 12: Exit regression
Explanatory variable Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)
(Intercept) -6.3752 0.3463 -18.41 0.0000
Total market valuet−1 -3.257e-12 0.0000 -1.42 0.1563
Market value of manageri,t−1 -2.109e-11 0.0000 -5.26 0.0000
February 0.0373 0.2336 0.16 0.8730
Mars 0.5686 0.2099 2.71 0.0067
April 0.8249 0.2021 4.08 0.0000
May 0.1795 0.2312 0.78 0.4375
June 0.8605 0.2062 4.17 0.0000
July -0.2625 0.2601 -1.01 0.3129
August 0.4695 0.2161 2.17 0.0298
September 1.0180 0.1962 5.19 0.0000
October 0.9417 0.1975 4.77 0.0000
November 0.3298 0.2201 1.50 0.1340
December -0.6975 0.2898 -2.41 0.0161
2002 0.8429 0.3249 2.59 0.0095
2003 1.8629 0.3005 6.20 0.0000
2004 0.9632 0.3522 2.73 0.0062
2005 0.9611 0.4068 2.36 0.0181
2006 1.1918 0.5069 2.35 0.0187
2007 1.9410 0.6044 3.21 0.0013
2008 2.1705 0.5470 3.97 0.0001
2009 1.4846 0.5562 2.67 0.0076
2010 2.0439 0.7273 2.81 0.0050
2011 2.8341 0.7960 3.56 0.0004
2012 2.3445 0.8879 2.64 0.0083
2013 2.2883 1.0938 2.09 0.0364
AIC 8 059.3
No. of observations 110 225
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C Result extended exit
Table 13: Extended exit regression
Explanatory variable Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)
(Intercept) 21.9622 12.5499 1.75 0.0801
Loge Market valuei,t−1 -0.1492 0.0180 -8.31 0.0000
Loge Number of mutual fundst−1 -3.9195 2.0103 -1.95 0.0512
Loge Market value of manageri,t−1 -0.0972 0.0199 -4.88 0.0000
February 0.0794 0.2353 0.34 0.7359
Mars 0.6337 0.2127 2.98 0.0029
April 0.8980 0.2059 4.36 0.0000
May 0.2420 0.2325 1.04 0.2981
June 0.9354 0.2096 4.46 0.0000
July -0.1704 0.2636 -0.65 0.5180
August 0.5509 0.2188 2.52 0.0118
September 1.1241 0.2021 5.56 0.0000
October 1.0572 0.2042 5.18 0.0000
November 0.4146 0.2228 1.86 0.0627
December -0.6195 0.2913 -2.13 0.0334
2002 1.3619 0.4777 2.85 0.0044
2003 2.5467 0.5251 4.85 0.0000
2004 1.7364 0.5897 2.94 0.0032
2005 1.8753 0.6749 2.78 0.0055
2006 2.2068 0.7909 2.79 0.0053
2007 2.9823 0.8651 3.45 0.0006
2008 3.3236 0.8703 3.82 0.0001
2009 2.6477 0.8542 3.10 0.0019
2010 3.0002 0.8653 3.47 0.0005
2011 3.7151 0.8676 4.28 0.0000
2012 3.1315 0.8863 3.53 0.0004
2013 2.9368 0.9794 3.00 0.0027
AIC 7 880.7
No. of observations 110 225
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D Result entry regression
Table 14: Entry regression
Explanatory variable Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)
(Intercept) 5.1102 1.2969 3.94 0.0001
Herfindahl-Hirschman Indext−1 0.0037 0.0013 2.83 0.0046
Total market valuet−1 3.02e-12 0.0000 1.50 0.1336
Market value of manageri,t−1 -3.24e-11 0.0000 -7.35 0.0000
Number of mutual fundst−1 -0.0248 0.0021 -11.55 0.0000
February -0.4522 0.1394 -3.24 0.0012
Mars -0.6245 0.1524 -4.10 0.0000
April -0.5282 0.1524 -3.47 0.0005
May 0.4375 0.1216 3.60 0.0003
June -0.8727 0.2007 -4.35 0.0000
July 0.2057 0.1392 1.48 0.1396
August -0.4141 0.1660 -2.49 0.0126
September -0.2712 0.1666 -1.63 0.1035
October 0.0329 0.1545 0.21 0.8312
November -0.0626 0.1517 -0.41 0.6798
December 0.0606 0.1481 0.41 0.6825
2002 2.0881 0.2926 7.14 0.0000
2003 2.1104 0.3375 6.25 0.0000
2004 2.7268 0.3730 7.31 0.0000
2005 3.0982 0.4543 6.82 0.0000
2006 4.7461 0.5832 8.14 0.0000
2007 5.2572 0.7594 6.92 0.0000
2008 5.7345 0.7600 7.55 0.0000
2009 5.6345 0.8195 6.88 0.0000
2010 5.7361 0.9304 6.17 0.0000
2011 5.9925 0.9510 6.30 0.0000
2012 5.8490 0.9882 5.92 0.0000
2013 6.2101 1.1140 5.57 0.0000
AIC 11,667
No. of observations 110,225
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E Result extended entry regression
Table 15: Extended entry regression
Explanatory variable Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)
(Intercept) -53.9378 12.6455 -4.27 0.0000
Loge Herfindahl-Hirschman Indext−1 4.3187 1.1867 3.64 0.0003
Loge Total market valuet−1 1.3701 0.3870 3.54 0.0004
Market value of manageri,t−1 -3.26e-11 0.0000 -7.38 0.0000
Number of mutual fundst−1 -0.0263 0.0022 -11.99 0.0000
February -0.4902 0.1397 -3.51 0.0004
Mars -0.6821 0.1532 -4.45 0.0000
April -0.5656 0.1527 -3.70 0.0002
May 0.3160 0.1263 2.50 0.0124
June -0.9589 0.2017 -4.75 0.0000
July 0.1322 0.1409 0.94 0.3483
August -0.4821 0.1667 -2.89 0.0038
September -0.3190 0.1678 -1.90 0.0573
October 0.0121 0.1554 0.08 0.9381
November -0.1263 0.1529 -0.83 0.4086
December -0.0052 0.1495 -0.03 0.9723
2002 2.0644 0.2900 7.12 0.0000
2003 1.8325 0.3373 5.43 0.0000
2004 2.1457 0.4155 5.16 0.0000
2005 2.2877 0.5298 4.32 0.0000
2006 3.7817 0.6616 5.72 0.0000
2007 4.2782 0.8091 5.29 0.0000
2008 4.8447 0.8100 5.98 0.0000
2009 4.9040 0.8614 5.69 0.0000
2010 4.9199 0.9408 5.23 0.0000
2011 5.0971 0.9410 5.42 0.0000
2012 4.8987 0.9517 5.15 0.0000
2013 5.2008 1.0074 5.16 0.0000
AIC 11,654
No. of observations 110,225
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